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Abstract
This paper explores the role of threats from below in the emergence of electoral
authoritarianism. Mass uprisings for democratic regime change undermine closed
authoritarian regimes by making it difficult for autocrats to maintain their regimes
through repression and co-optation. Anti-regime uprisings also promote the
establishment of electoral authoritarianism by toppling existing closed regimes
or by compelling autocrats to offer political reform as a survival strategy. My
analysis of closed authoritarian regimes, from 1961 to 2006, reveals that anti-
regime mass uprisings are significantly associated with transitions to electoral
authoritarianism. I also find that nonviolent uprisings are more likely than violent
uprisings to result in the establishment of electoral authoritarianism and that
the effect of anti-regime uprisings on transitions to electoral authoritarianism is
greater when a country is surrounded by more democracies or is ethnically or
religiously homogeneous.
∗Assistant Professor, Department of Political Science, University of Nebraska-Lincoln, namkyu@unl.edu
Przeworski (2009, p.291) poses a question fundamental to democratic political reform: “Why
would people who monopolize political power ever decide to put their interests or values at
risk by sharing it with others? Specifically, why would those who hold political rights in the
form of suffrage decide to extend these rights to anyone else?” He argues that revolutionary
threats compel elites to acquiesce to demands for institutional reform. This article asks a
similar question regarding the introduction of multiparty elections for the national executive
and legislature in authoritarian regimes. Why would autocrats embrace electoral competition
that puts their own interests at risk?
Given the widespread adoption of authoritarian elections, a growing body of studies
purports to explain the functional roles of multiparty elections in autocracies.1 These studies
tend to “view the establishment of elections as a means by which dictators hold onto power”
(Gandhi & Lust-Okar, 2009, p.404). Yet as Brancati (2014, p.321) points out, researchers
often “infer leaders’ motivation for adopting nominally democratic institutions from the
outcomes they produce.” Inferring the reasons for the emergence of multiparty elections
from the roles those elections play in regimes, however, assumes that the functions served
by authoritarian elections also explain their causes, which is not necessarily true (Brancati,
2014, p.321; Gandhi & Lust-Okar, 2009, p.407).
Consequently, the current literature is plagued by a lack of systematic cross-national
studies on the establishment of electoral authoritarianism (EA). EA regimes have multiparty
elections with universal suffrage for the executive and legislature. This absence is in marked
contrast to the accumulation of sophisticated empirical studies on the determinants of
democratization (e.g., Acemoglu, Johnson, Robinson, & Yared, 2008). Researchers have yet
to develop a systemic understanding of what factors are significantly associated with regime
change to EA as well as whether the determinants of democratization also promote such
1According to recent studies, authoritarian elections 1) provide information about the
underlying support for a regime (Magaloni, 2006) and the strength of the opposition (Cox,
2009); 2) efficiently distribute patronage to regime insiders, citizens, and the opposition
(Blaydes, 2010; Magaloni, 2006); and 3) co-opt the opposition (Gandhi & Przeworski, 2007).
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transitions.
In this article, I analyze the role of mass uprisings2 in prompting transitions from
closed regimes to EA regimes,3 drawing on mass-based perspectives about democratization
(Acemoglu & Robinson, 2006; Bratton & Walle, 1997; Bunce & Wolchik, 2010; Przeworski,
1991; Schedler, 2013; Wood, 2000). Widespread and sustained mass uprisings demanding
democratic reform produce significant social unrest and political instability, undermining the
regime’s legitimacy and thereby precipitating regime overthrow. Therefore, anti-regime mass
uprisings pose a credible threat to leader tenure, making it difficult for autocrats to maintain
their rule through repression and co-optation. I propose that mass uprisings promote the
emergence of EA in two ways: 1) They can topple existing closed regimes, which may lead
to the establishment of new EA regimes, or 2) they can compel authoritarian elites to offer
political reform as a survival strategy without producing leadership change.
In my analysis of closed authoritarian regimes from 1961 to 2006, I find strong evidence
for a relationship between mass uprisings for regime change and transitions to electoral
autocracies. Anti-regime uprisings prompt both EA transitions with and without leadership
turnover. Furthermore, my analyses confirm that EA transitions follow anti-regime uprisings,
not the other way around. Last, consistent with previous studies on nonviolent movements
(Celestino & Gleditsch, 2013; Chenoweth & Stephan, 2011; Schock, 2005; Sharp, 1973), I find
that nonviolent uprisings are more likely than violent uprisings to result in the establishment
of EA and that the effect of nonviolent anti-regime uprisings on EA transitions is enhanced
when a country is both surrounded by more democracies and less ethnically fractionalized.
This article contributes to the burgeoning literature on EA by systematically exploring
the role of popular protests in initiating specific regime changes and by evaluating such protests
against the political and socio-economic factors emphasized by competing explanations. My
2I use the terms “mass uprisings,” “mass mobilization,” and “mass protests” interchangeably
throughout the article.
3Transitions from closed authoritarianism account for 82% of transitions to EA. See Table
A2.
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study also weighs in on the ongoing debate over the extent to which popular protests prompt
the collapse of authoritarian regimes and promote political liberalization. These results
contribute to a growing body of quantitative evidence demonstrating the importance of
popular protests in prompting suffrage extensions (Aidt & Jensen, 2014; Przeworski, 2009)
and democratization (Celestino & Gleditsch, 2013; Teorell, 2010; Ulfelder, 2005). Last, this
study provides a rare cross-national examination of transitions to EA regimes, highlighting
the importance of both mass protests and international factors.
Electoral Authoritarianism
Scholars generally agree over two defining characteristics of electoral authoritarianism: the
existence of electoral contestation and the violation of democratic principles of freedom
and fairness. The first attribute distinguishes electoral authoritarian regimes from “closed”
authoritarian regimes (Howard & Roessler, 2006; Schedler, 2013). EA regimes regularly
allow electoral contest for executive power, although elections are often flawed and minimally
competitive. Hence, EA regimes also differ from multiparty autocracies, which emphasize
party pluralism without subjecting the head of government to electoral competition (Schedler,
2013, p.82). Thus, authoritarian regimes, such as Jordan, Kuwait and Morocco, that allow for
multiparty competition only in legislative or subnational elections do not qualify as electoral
autocracies.
On the other hand, the formal properties of representative institutions do not distin-
guish between electoral autocracies and democracies. As Diamond (2002, p.28) notes, “the
distinction between electoral democracy and electoral authoritarianism turns crucially on the
freedom, fairness, inclusiveness, and meaningfulness of elections.” When an electoral regime
fully violates at least one of these minimum attributes of democratic elections, it qualifies as
EA (Schedler, 2013, p.80). In EA regimes, violations of the democratic principles through
electoral manipulation are both frequent and serious enough that the regime fails to meet
conventional minimum standards for democracy (Levitsky & Way, 2010; Schedler, 2013).
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Theoretical Discussion
I argue that mass uprisings demanding regime change promote institutional reform. In making
this argument, I follow extant scholarship on political liberalization and democratization
from below, focusing on the conflict between regime insiders and opposition actors (Acemoglu
& Robinson, 2006; Bratton & Walle, 1997; Bunce & Wolchik, 2010; Chenoweth & Stephan,
2011; Howard & Roessler, 2006; Wood, 2000). According to this perspective, multiparty
politics are “extorted concessions” (Cox, 2009, p.4) in that autocrats are compelled to hold
elections in response to popular revolutionary threats. Below, I describe how mass protests
for regime change undermine closed authoritarian regimes and promote the introduction of
multiparty politics. I also explain why nonviolent protests are more effective in doing so than
violent protests.
Anti-regime Uprisings and Emergence of Multiparty Elections
Widespread and sustained mass protests seeking regime change pose a direct threat to
incumbent authoritarian regimes simply because they can expel long-ruling autocrats and
overthrow incumbent regimes (Teorell, 2010; Ulfelder, 2005). Such protests signal not
only widespread discontent with the government but also the potential for regime change,
demonstrating that many obstacles to mobilizing and organizing popular support, to a degree,
have been overcome. Mass movements often serve as focal points for facilitating coordination
against the government. When anti-regime movements mobilize a large number of people,
they enjoy substantial resources and are thus more capable of producing significant social
and political unrest and undermining the regime legitimacy (Sharp, 1973).
Autocratic leaders facing these mass uprisings face many political hazards. Repressive
strategies targeting large numbers of people entail considerable costs, though high costs
do not always deter autocratic elites (Bellin, 2004). Repression risks undermining support
for the incumbent regime by creating dissent among regime supporters and provoking
international condemnation (Chenoweth & Stephan, 2011; Levitsky & Way, 2010; Teorell,
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2010). Additionally, agents responsible for perpetrating repression may refuse to follow
orders due to moral constraints, fears of international prosecution, or concerns about other
forms of public retribution (Levitsky & Way, 2010; Nepstad, 2013). For example, military
defections were critical to the outcome of several popular uprisings, in particular the “Color
Revolutions” of the early 2000s and the “Arab Spring” of 2010-2012 (see Beissinger, 2007;
Brownlee, Masoud, & Reynolds, 2015; Nepstad, 2013).
Figure 1 about here
Supporting this claim, Figure 1 demonstrates that mass uprisings threaten not only
autocratic leaders’ tenure but also autocratic regime survival. The risks of leader removals
and regime breakdowns are significantly higher in the presence of popular uprisings seeking
to overthrow the regime. Similarly, Geddes, Wright, and Frantz’s (2014) data on autocratic
regimes show that one in four autocratic collapses and one in three coerced autocratic
breakdowns are due to violent or nonviolent popular uprisings.
Therefore, mass uprisings make it difficult for autocrats to maintain closed regimes
through repression and co-optation. Accumulating costs of popular uprisings induces other
elites to pressure the government into making democratic concessions to regime opponents
(Wood, 2000). When mobilization reaches a sufficient magnitude, widespread protests compel
dictators to gamble on whether to resist popular uprisings or concede to demands for far-
reaching institutional reforms (Acemoglu & Robinson, 2006). Either option is not attractive
because embracing multiparty elections can create opportunities for periodic challenges.
Indeed, even authoritarian multiparty elections sometimes produced close election results,
electoral defeats, and leadership turnovers (Bunce & Wolchik, 2010; Howard & Roessler, 2006;
Levitsky & Way, 2010).
Figure 2 about here
Nevertheless, political reforms establishing multiparty elections can give ruling elites the
opportunity to retain or regain political power when faced with mass unrest. Elites may be
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confident that they can control the electoral process and survive multiparty elections (Joseph,
1997). Additionally, losing power through competitive elections results in better post-ousting
fates than losing power through irregular means. As illustrated in Figure 2, only around 35%
of autocrats who were ousted through elections suffered exile, jail, or death while more than
80% of autocrats who were irregularly removed suffered similar fates. Ruling elites may thus
prefer conceding to multiparty elections to risking violent exits (see also Debs, 2016). This is
true particularly when popular protests increase the risk of irregular leader removal. Hence,
mass protests can induce elites to calculate the costs of allowing multiparty elections as lower
than the risks of maintaining the status quo.
This discussion suggests two pathways from closed to electoral authoritarianism. First,
popular uprisings can topple a long-standing dictator and lead to the establishment of a
new electoral regime by building representative institutions, including multiparty elections.
However, the emergence of the new electoral regime does not necessarily lead to democrati-
zation since newly elected elites could manipulate election results and continue to restrict
political and civil liberties. Post-communist countries Armenia, Romania, Russia, Serbia, and
Ukraine followed this path (Levitsky & Way, 2010). Data show that ten of the ninety-one EA
transitions during the period of 1946-2006 were preceded by large-scale anti-regime uprisings
and irregular leader turnovers (see Table 1 below).
Second, popular threats can compel rulers to adopt multiparty competition as a partial
concession. However, autocrats may continue to hold power through electoral manipulation.
Many dictators in sub-Saharan African countries, such as Gambia, Niger, and Sudan, faced
increased popular discontent accompanying the economic decline of the 1990s (Bratton &
Walle, 1997; Herbst, 2001). Recognizing the need to renew their political legitimacy, they
opted to adopt multiparty elections while remaining in power and controlling the transition
process. According to Bratton and Walle (1997, p.117), twenty-eight of forty-two sub-Saharan
African countries experienced mass protests between 1988 and 1992, and all of them underwent
political liberalization by the end of that period. In this pathway to EA, the introduction of
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multiparty politics is a response by ruling elites to popular threats. My calculation shows
that twenty-four EA transitions were preceded by a large-scale anti-regime uprising without
irregular leader turnovers. Accordingly, my first hypothesis is as follows:
H1 Closed authoritarian regimes are more likely to introduce multiparty politics when faced
with anti-regime uprisings.
Widespread and sustained popular protests also trigger democratization, thereby precipi-
tating the introduction of multiparty politics. As Schedler (2013, p.60) argues, democratization
is “a two-stage fight, first over the introduction of representative institutions and then over
their effectiveness.” O’Donnell and Schmitter (1986, p.3) characterize the move to multiparty
politics as “transitions from certain authoritarian regimes toward an uncertain ‘something
else’ .” Thus, when regime actors successfully control the process of multiparty elections to
thwart opposition challenges, and opposition actors cannot prevent electoral and institutional
manipulations, transitions will fall short of democratization (Levitsky & Way, 2010). Even
where mass protests force incumbent autocrats out of power, transitions may give rise to new
authoritarian regimes with nominally democratic institutions.4
Violent vs. Nonviolent uprisings
Several scholars have argued that nonviolent uprisings are more effective at promoting regime
transition than violent uprisings (Celestino & Gleditsch, 2013; Chenoweth & Stephan, 2011;
Schock, 2005; Sharp, 1973). Examining all known 323 cases of violent and nonviolent uprisings
from 1900 to 2006, Chenoweth and Stephan (2011) demonstrate that nonviolent campaigns are
more likely to oust incumbent governments and result in transitions to democracy than violent
campaigns. Teorell (2010) and Celestino and Gleditsch (2013) similarly find that nonviolent
mobilization is more likely to promote democratic transitions than violent mobilization.
4An important question is under what conditions anti-regime uprisings lead to democrati-
zation rather than to electoral authoritarianism. This question is beyond the scope of this
paper and is the domain of future research.
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Previous studies have also identified a number of explanations for the efficacy of
nonviolent uprisings at toppling closed authoritarian regimes and prompting transitions to
EA. First, nonviolent movements mobilize more participants both because they tend to
occur in urban areas and because they make a greater effort to attract participants. Second,
repressing nonviolent uprisings is riskier than repressing violent uprisings, as the repression of
nonviolent uprisings can prompt defections by members of coercive agencies and initiate even
more mobilization against the regime. These two characteristics enable nonviolent uprisings
to pose a greater threat to regimes. Last, nonviolent uprisings are more likely to result in
bargaining with the regime, creating a greater schism between elite hard-liners and soft-liners.
Authoritarian elites are thus more likely to make political concessions in the face of nonviolent
protests. Overall, this discussion leads to my second hypothesis:
H2 Nonviolent anti-regime uprisings are more effective than violent anti-regime uprisings in
promoting the establishment of EA.
Conditional Effects of Anti-regime Uprisings
The effect of anti-regime uprisings may vary in different contexts. Building on previous
research on regime changes, I explore three contextual factors that may condition the effect
of mass protests on EA transitions.5
First, elite-based theories emphasize the importance of divisions within ruling elites
in precipitating political liberalization (e.g., O’Donnell & Schmitter, 1986). Elite splits
increase the likelihood of negotiation between soft-liners of the ruling group and moderate
elements of the opposition. In addition, Svolik (2012) shows that more than two-thirds of
dictators who lost power in an irregular fashion from 1945 to 2008 were removed by coups
executed by regimes insiders. However, these arguments do not invalidate the importance
of popular uprisings in precipitating transitions to EA as threats from below interact with
threats from within Schedler, 2013, p. 36; Przeworski, 1991, p. 57; Wood, 2000. Popular
5Space constraints do not allow me to elaborate on these mechanisms, but they deserve
more investigation.
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protests often cause splits within regimes and coups in that they can signal dissatisfaction
with the incumbent ruling elites or facilitate coordination among elites (Beissinger, 2007;
Casper & Tyson, 2014) Additionally, Miller (2012, p.1006) claims that “[v]iolent turnover
removes the regime’s aura of invincibility, providing a clear signal to citizens that the regime
can be changed by concerted action” and “can serve as a coordination signal, or triggering
event, for regime opponents.” Accordingly, where mass movements for regime change coincide
with important divisions within regimes, they may be more effective in bringing about EA
transitions.
Next, social cleavages based on ascriptive identities, such as ethnicity or religion,
may impact the effectiveness of anti-regime uprisings.6 In more ethnically or religiously
fractionalized societies, ethnic or religious ruling groups are more likely to be smaller in size.
Furthermore, ethnic or religious tensions can make conflict between ruling groups and excluded
groups intractable (Horowitz, 1985). Thus, authoritarian elites in more heterogeneous societies
may find multiparty elections less attractive, making them more likely to resist popular
protests and refuse to offer political concessions. Meanwhile, social diversity may pose
coordination problems for opposition groups, impeding the emergence of unified opposition
against the regime (Weingast, 1997).7 Accordingly, in ethnically or religiously diverse countries,
anti-regime protests may be less successful in undermining incumbent regimes or pressuring
ruling elites to adopt political reform.
Finally, international context also may shape the power of domestic actors and their
preferences for institutions (Celestino & Gleditsch, 2013; Gleditsch & Ward, 2006). When
a country has a higher proportion of democratic neighbors, mass movements may be more
effective in achieving domestic institutional changes. Regime opponents are more likely
to mobilize in order to demand political reform when they seek to emulate the political
6I thank an anonymous reviewer for suggesting this point.
7This does not necessarily mean that anti-regime uprisings are less likely to emerge in
more heterogeneous societies since shared identities may decrease collective action costs, and
ethnic or religious grievances may motivate anti-regime movements.
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liberalization and democratization of neighboring, structurally equivalent countries. At the
same time, they will be better equipped to engage in anti-regime struggles because they
will have greater access to resources from neighboring countries. Last, repression costs to
dictators are likely to increase when democracy becomes relatively more common among
neighbors. Therefore, the proportion of neighboring democracies will increase the likelihood
that popular uprisings lead to institutional changes.
Data
To examine the relationship between mass uprisings for regime change and transitions from
closed to EA regimes, I examine all closed authoritarian regimes from 1961 to 2006.8 A
country leaves the risk set in year t when the closed authoritarian regime at year t − 1 is
replaced by an EA regime or by a democracy at year t.
Dependent Variable
The dependent variable is a transition from closed authoritarianism to EA. For the definition
of EA, I follow Schedler (2013). Fundamental attributes underpinning EA include the
following: 1) elections should be regular; 2) elections should be inclusive in the sense that
they are held under universal suffrage; 3) opposition candidates are allowed to participate in
national elections; 4) opposition parties are allowed to win votes and seats; and 5) the head
of government is subject to electoral competition (Schedler, 2013, p.82). These institutional
requirements exclude de jure or de facto single party regimes that prohibit multiparty
competition as well as multiparty autocracies that establish only legislative or subnational
elections (e.g., monarchies allowing for only legislative elections).
To measure EA, I rely on the dataset recently developed by Skaaning, Gerring, and
Bartusevičius (2015), which covers all independent countries from 1800 to 2013. Skaaning
et al. propose a lexical index of electoral democracy that is “a series of necessary-and-
sufficient conditions arrayed in an ordinal scale” (p.1492). A regime that establishes and
8I remove periods of foreign occupation, as defined in the Polity IV data. The inclusion of
these periods does not change the result.
11
maintains “minimally competitive, multiparty elections with universal suffrage for legislature
and executive” qualifies as an electoral democracy (Skaaning et al., 2015, p.1497).
This dataset provides information on six binary variables to identify electoral democracy:
1) elections for the legislature, 2) elections for the national executive, 3) multiparty competition,
4) male suffrage, 5) female suffrage, and 6) the quality of elections. The first five variables
capture all the institutional requirements of electoral authoritarianism proposed by Schedler.
The quality of elections measures whether “the elections are, in principle, sufficiently free
to enable the opposition to gain power if they were to attract sufficient support from
the electorate” (Skaaning et al., 2015, p.1501). This variable is crucial for differentiating
democracy, minimally defined, from electoral authoritarianism. Accordingly, a regime is
coded as EA when the components 1 through 5 equal one and the quality of elections equals
0.
As a robustness check, I use two alternative measures to define the universe of autocracies.
I employ democracy measures from two other datasets on political regimes: Boix, Miller,
and Rosato (2013) and Geddes et al. (2014). In their coding of democracy, these datasets
explicitly consider electoral quality using multiple sources of information on elections rather
than focusing only on election outcomes while holding a procedural definition of democracy.
Independent Variable
To measure large-scale anti-regime uprisings, I draw on the Nonviolent and Violent Campaigns
and Outcomes (NAVCO) dataset developed by Chenoweth and Lewis (2013). The dataset
provides detailed information on 250 campaigns defined as “a series of observable, continuous,
purposive mass tactics or events in pursuit of a political objective” (Chenoweth & Lewis,
2013, p.416) from 1945 to 2006 and on each campaign’s onset year and end year. To qualify
as a campaign, an uprising must have had at least 1,000 observed participants and discernible
leadership. Additionally, the NAVCO dataset includes only major campaigns that at one time
claimed “maximalist” goals of removing the existing regime, expelling foreign occupations, or
achieving self-determination.
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I create Anti-regime uprising that includes only campaigns whose goals are related
to either “regime change” or “significant institutional reform.” Anti-regime uprising is a
sum of anti-regime campaigns in the previous three years. I also use a different, five-year
period, as well as a dichotomous measure of whether an anti-regime campaign has occurred
within one-year, three-year, and five-year time frames. The main results remain similar
(reported in Section 6 of the Supporting Appendix). I also construct Other uprising to include
all remaining campaigns pursuing the goals of “territorial secession,” “greater autonomy,”
“anti-occupation,” or “policy change.” Last, using the information from the NAVCO dataset,
I differentiate between primarily nonviolent and violent campaigns.
Table 1 about here
Table 1 presents a cross-tabulation of anti-regime uprisings (in the previous three years)
and EA transitions.9 Nearly 40% of all EA transitions from 1947 to 2006 (thirty-six cases) are
preceded by anti-regime uprisings.10 The table shows that the likelihood of EA transitions
significantly varies across different types of popular uprisings, demonstrating the importance
of uprisings’ strategies and goals. To illustrate, the probability of EA transition given no
anti-regime uprising is only 2%. It jumps to 6% following a violent anti-regime uprising and
14% following a non-violent anti-regime uprising. The bottom panel of Table 1 distinguishes
EA transition with and without irregular leader turnover in the two-year period before
EA transition. Half of EA transitions accompanied by irregular leader turnovers followed
anti-regime uprisings. Both types of EA transitions are more likely to occur in the wake of
anti-regime uprisings, particularly non-violent ones.
9In the case of multiple campaigns in a country-year, I prioritize nonviolent uprisings and
anti-regime uprisings.
10When I include anti-government demonstrations from Banks and Wilson (2013) in the
measure of anti-regime uprisings, the percentage of EA transitions following popular protests
is 70%.
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Control Variables
To control for potential confounding variables and alternative explanations, I include a
number of control variables based on the existing literature on political liberalization and
democratization.
First, I control for domestic political conditions that might affect both popular uprisings
and the likelihood of transitions to EA. A more liberalized and open autocracy might allow
more mobilization against the regime and be more likely to establish multiparty elections.
If so, the estimate of anti-regime uprisings could simply pick up the effect of the prior
level of political liberalization. To ensure against this possibility, I include the liberal
democracy index taken from the Varieties of Democracy data (Coppedge et al., 2015). In
addition, the incumbent regime’s strength will be negatively associated with both anti-regime
mobilization and political reform. Greater coercive capacity discourages the opposition from
mobilizing and organizing, enhancing the regime’s survival and dampening prospects for
political liberalization (Albertus & Menaldo, 2012; Levitsky & Way, 2010). To proxy Coercive
capacity, I follow Albertus and Menaldo (2012) in using the size of military personnel per
capita taken from the Correlates of War Project. I log-transform this variable after adding 1
to each value since it is right-skewed.
Similarly, political instability can open windows of opportunity during which mass
protests are more likely to occur. To control for intra-elite conflicts, I create a binary
indicator Elite unrest that flags whether failed coup attempts, coup plots, and alleged coup
plots occurred in the previous three years. These coup attempts may signal fissure within
the ruling elite. Additionally, I include a dichotomous variable Irregular leader turnover for
whether irregular leadership change has occurred within the last three years.
Economic factors are among the most studied determinants of democratization. As
the modernization theory suggests, economic development may generate greater domestic
pressure for multiparty elections as well as increase the likelihood of popular uprisings. On
the other hand, short-term economic growth may have the opposite effect on regime changes.
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I include GDP per capita and and an annual percentage change in per capita GDP (taken
from Maddison (2010).)
International factors may also affect EA transitions. Many scholars argue that autocrats
establish multiparty elections to obtain international economic and political benefits (Bratton
& Walle, 1997; Joseph, 1997; Levitsky & Way, 2010). Thus, I include the degree of aid
dependence, operationalized as a natural log of net official development assistance per capita
in the previous year (obtained from World Bank (2014)), an indicator of the post-Cold War
era, and an interaction term between foreign aid and the post-Cold War period. I also
include the proportion of neighboring democracies and electoral autocracies to control for
the diffusion effects of democratic institutions (Gleditsch & Ward, 2006). I define a country’s
neighbors to be countries with a minimum distance of 501 km, as reported in the cshapes R
library.
Last, I include a natural log of the duration of non-electoral authoritarian regimes in
order to control for negative duration dependence, which indicates that the rate at which a
closed authoritarian regime transitions to EA or democracy decreases over time.
Results
Main Results
I estimate several regression models to examine the effect of anti-regime uprisings on the
probability of transitions to EA regime. Table 2 reports the results of logit models of EA
transitions. Model 1 includes only Anti-regime uprising, Other uprising, a linear time trend,
and ln(Regime age). Model 2 adds economic and international variables that may influence
both anti-regime uprisings and transitions to EA regime. To ensure that the estimate of
Anti-regime uprising is not a proxy for the regime’s instability or weakness, Models 3 through
5 control for political variables measuring prior political liberalization, coercive capacity,
irregular leadership changes, and intra-elite conflict. Last, Models 4 and 5 reestimate Models
3 and 4 on ten multiply-imputed datasets since many observations have missing data among
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control variables, and listwise deletion of these observations may result in biased inference.11
Table 2 about here
Across all specifications, anti-regime protests are significantly associated with the
probability of transitions to EA regime. Regarding the substantive impact, a change from
zero to one anti-regime uprising in the past three years is associated with a 40% increase in
the probability of EA transitions (2.5% per year to 3.5% per year), and a change from zero
to three is associated with a 2.6-fold increase in the probability of EA transitions (from 2.5%
per year to 6.6% per year).12 In contrast, little evidence suggests a significant relationship
between Other uprising and EA transitions. This finding demonstrates that it is not social
and political unrest in general but a popular push for democratic reform that drives political
opening.
Moreover, the magnitude of the estimate of Anti-regime uprising remains quite consistent,
regardless of whether I include full control variables. This demonstrates two important findings
about the effect of Anti-regime uprising. First, Anti-regime uprising does not simply reflect
the political and social environment that produced the anti-regime mobilization in the first
place. Second, the stability of the coefficient of Anti-regime uprising indicates that the
observed result is less likely to be driven by selection bias. According to Altonji, Elder,
and Taber (2005), the degree of similarity between the coefficient estimated in a restricted
model with no or few controls and one estimated in a full model provides a good heuristic for
evaluating the robustness of the result to potential bias from unobservables. Below I assess
the likelihood that the main estimates are driven by selection bias.
11The comparison between Models 3 and 5 shows that missing data reduce the sample size
by about 30%. Missing data on control variables are imputed using Amelia II (Honaker,
King, Blackwell, et al., 2011), and Models 4 and 5 show averages of ten estimation results
using Stata’s mi estimate command. See the Supporting Appendix for details of multiple
imputation.
12I use Model 3 of Table 2 to calculate these predicted probabilities. I set all the other
covariates to the values observed for each observation and obtain average effects.
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Among other political variables included in the models, Coercive capacity and Liberal
democracy index have a systemic relationship with the likelihood of transition to EA. When
a closed authoritarian regime is more politically liberalized or when it has weaker coercive
capacity, it is more likely to transition to EA. Elite unrest and Irregular leader turnover are,
as expected, positive although Irregular leader turnover is not statistically significant.
The importance of external factors, as stressed by current literature (Levitsky & Way,
2010), is also borne out by the results in Table 2. Regional environments favorable to
democracy makes closed authoritarian regimes more likely to transition to EA regimes.
Additionally, more foreign aid inflows increase the prospects for the adoption of multiparty
elections, but only during the post-Cold War period. During the Cold War, however, the
same change in aid dependence does not improve the probability of transitions to electoral
autocracies. The end of the Cold War period also significantly increases the likelihood of
transition to electoral authoritarianism to the extent that a country is dependent on foreign
aid. The results indicate that internal and external pressure for democracy promote the
emergence of EA regimes.
Table 3 about here
Table 3 distinguishes between nonviolent and violent anti-regime campaigns and esti-
mates the same set of models from Table 2.13 Supportive of H2, the coefficient estimates
of Nonviolent anti-regime uprising are consistently positive, statistically significant at the
1% level, and remarkably stable across different models. They are also greater in magnitude
than those of violent campaigns. The one-tailed test for the equality of the two coefficients
rejects the null hypothesis at the 1% level. Substantively, an increase from zero to one in
Nonviolent anti-regime uprising more than doubles the probability of transition to EA, and
an increase from zero to three is associated with a nine-fold increase in that probability. On
the other hand, the same change in Violent anti-regime uprising produces a 65% increase in
that probability. Consistent with existing studies on nonviolent resistance (e.g., Celestino
13The full estimation results are available in the appendix.
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& Gleditsch, 2013; Chenoweth & Lewis, 2013), these results suggest that nonviolent mass
mobilization against the government is more effective than violent insurrection in undermining
closed autocracies and inducing political concessions from incumbent governments.
Additional Analyses
I further examine whether the temporal pattern of events conforms to the temporal sequence
postulated in the theoretical discussion introduced above. Figure 3 plots the evolution of the
annual number of Anti-regime uprising and Other uprising around electoral transition, with
year 0 corresponding to the year of transition. The top panel of the figure shows that the
average number of Anti-regime uprising sharply jumps in the years leading up to the transition
and sharply declines immediately after. This temporal pattern in anti-regime uprisings is
consistent with what we would observe if mass-based theories are correct. Contrarily, the
number of Other uprising does not change systemically before the transition year. This again
confirms the importance of uprisings’ goals in prompting political reform.
Figure 3 about here
I also conduct a placebo test to examine whether political reform follows mass protests.
I regress transitions to EA on anti-regime uprisings in year t+ 1, controlling for the same set
of variables in Model 3 of Table 2. If this argument is correct, protests in year t+ 1 should
not predict EA transition in year t. Otherwise, my results may be simply picking up the
correlation between political instability and regime transitions. I also test for different lags
of anti-regime uprisings. The results of the placebo test are reported in Figure 4. Political
uprisings in year t+1 are uncorrelated with regime changes in year t. In contrast, the estimates
on contemporaneous and lagged uprisings are consistently positive and statistically significant.
This mitigates a concern that the estimates of popular uprisings I have documented above
could be driven by political turmoil in the regime transition period and confirms the temporal
sequence from protests to EA transition illustrated in Figure 3. Importantly, anti-regime
uprisings in year t− 2 has the strongest impact on the probability of transitions to EA in the
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current year. This indicates that it may take some time, possibly years, for an incumbent
or new regime to establish multiparty elections. In sum, Figures 3 and 4 provide additional
support for a causal relationship between popular threats and transitions.
Figure 4 about here
Next, I differentiate between EA transitions with and without leadership turnover. My
theoretical discussion suggests that anti-regime protests can topple existing closed regimes,
which may lead to the establishment of new EA regimes, or they can compel authoritarian
elites to offer political reform as a survival strategy without producing leadership change.
If this argument is correct, anti-regime protests should make both types of EA transitions
more likely to occur. Table 4 presents the results of multinomial logit models in which the
dependent variable can take three possible values: a survival of closed regime, a transition to
EA without leader turnover, and a transition to democracy with leader turnover. This allows
me to compare the effect of anti-regime uprisings on two different types of EA transitions.
As expected, only Anti-regime uprising are significantly associated with both types of EA
transitions. When I compare nonviolent and violent anti-regime uprisings, nonviolent uprisings
are more strongly correlated with both types of EA transitions than are violent uprisings.
Figure 5 about here
Last, I explore how popular uprisings interact within transnational contexts to shape a
country’s prospects of transitions to EA. For space reasons, I therefore report results tables
in the appendix and discuss only the substantive impact of anti-regime uprisings. Supporting
H3a, the leftmost panel of Figure 5 shows that anti-regime uprisings are more likely to
prompt EA transitions as the proportion of neighboring democracies is higher. Contrarily, I
fail to find evidence that anti-regime uprisings are more effective when the incumbent regime
has experienced intra-elite conflicts (the second panel of Figure 5). Last, the third panel
includes an interaction between ethno-linguistic fractionalization index (Fearon & Laitin,
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2003) and anti-regime uprisings. Ethnic fractionalization significantly decreases the effect of
anti-regime uprisings on EA transitions.14 In a similar vein, anti-regime uprisings are less
likely to promote EA transition when the country has previously experienced ethnic wars.
Taken together, the results suggest that domestic and international contexts significantly
condition the effect of anti-regime mobilization on political reform to establish multiparty
elections.
Assessing Potential Selection Bias
The biggest challenge to the empirical analysis is the endogenous nature of popular uprisings:
Protesters choose their targets and goals strategically. Anti-regime uprisings will be more
likely to erupt in regimes that are weaker or more politically liberalized, and these regimes
may be more likely to transition to EA. Similarly, protesters may be more likely to challenge
the regime nonviolently when they believe that their target regime is weaker. I thus include
the measures of coercive capacity, political liberalization, and regime instability and show
that the results are strongly robust to controlling these factors. Nevertheless, I recognize
that these controls will not perfectly capture unobserved factors that may be correlated
with anti-regime uprisings and EA transitions, which may bias my findings. Additionally, I
cannot exclude the possibility that country-years with anti-regime protests are fundamentally
different from those without anti-regime protests.
To mitigate these concerns, I adopt two strategies. First, I use a matching technique
to facilitate comparison of treated and control units which are similar in terms of their
observable characteristics. Using the method of coarsened exact matching (Iacus, King, &
Porro, 2011), I pre-process the data to minimize any potential differences between cases with
and without Anti-regime uprising (or Nonviolent anti-regime uprising) before conducting the
parametric analysis. I match on Urban population, GDP per capita, Economic growth, Prior
liberalization, Coercive capacity, Elite unrest, and Neighboring democracies. Table A19 of the
14I find similar results when I use an ethno-linguistic fragmentation measure of Alesina,
Devleeschauwer, Easterly, Kurlat, and Wacziarg (2003) or a religious fractionalization measure.
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appendix shows that the use of the matching technique does not alter the central findings.
Second, I rely on the strategy proposed by Altonji et al. (2005) to evaluate the likelihood
that selection bias due to unobservables may be driving the results. This strategy assesses
how many times stronger selection on unobservables would have to be relative to selection
on observables, included in my empirical model, to explain away the estimated effect of
Anti-regime uprising. If unobserved factors left out of the model have only a weak effect, I
can be more confident that selection bias does not drive the main result. Table A20 of the
appendix shows that to attribute the estimated effect of Anti-regime uprising, reported in
Model 3 of Table 2, to selection bias, unobserved factors would have to explain a variation in
the outcome between 3.6 and 19 times larger than what the observed covariates explain.15
Given that I already control for several factors determining the onset of anti-regime uprising,
the large ratios suggest that it is unlikely that unobserved confounders are driving the central
results. I also repeat this sensitivity test for the estimates of Nonviolent uprising. Table A20
shows that selection on unobservables would have to be at least 8 times, and at most 12
times, greater than selection on observables. Thus, it is unlikely that selection bias explains
away the entire effect.
Robustness Checks
To ensure the robustness of my results, I perform several additional analyses (the results are
available in the Supporting Appendix). The main finding is robust to the following analyses:
• Employing alternative measures of EA by removing short-lived EA cases (less than
three years) or using different regime type data: Boix et al. (2013) and Geddes et al.
(2014) (Table A7).
• Using alternative codings of Anti-regime uprising (Tables A8-A11).
15The calculation is based on the ratio βˆF/(βˆR − βˆF ) where βˆF is the coefficient of Anti-
regime uprising in Model 3 with full controls and βˆR is the coefficient of Anti-regime uprising
in models with a set of restricted controls. Following Nunn and Wantchekon (2011), I use
linear probability models.
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• Using anti-government demonstration from Banks and Wilson (2013) to measure Anti-
regime uprising (Tables A12 and A13).
• Including year fixed effects, regional fixed effects and/or country random effects to
control for common time shocks and unobserved country effects (Table A14).
• Including additional variables including oil income per capita, inequality, trade openness
or different autocratic regime type (taken from Geddes et al. (2014)). (Tables A15 and
A16).
• Examining the results’ sensitivity to adding or deleting control variables. Using the
Stata program developed by Young and Holsteen (2015), I estimate 4,096 models, which
are all possible combinations of control variables in Model 3 of Table 1. In every model,
the estimated coefficient on Anti-regime uprising is positive and statistically significant
at the 5% level (Figure A2).
Conclusion
This article explores the political dynamics that lead to the emergence of EA, with a focus
on the role of mass movements demanding regime change. The findings provide several
insights on the relationship between mass protests and transitions to multiparty politics.
While anti-regime mass protests promote the establishment of multiparty elections, socio-
economic factors, potential long-term determinants of democracy, do not seem to promote the
establishment of electoral authoritarianism. This suggests that immediate popular threats,
not a broader societal demand for democracy, drive the emergence of EA regimes. This is
consistent with previous findings that extensions of suffrage constitute a response by political
elites to revolutionary threats from the excluded (Aidt & Jensen, 2014; Przeworski, 2009).
These findings have further implications about the effect of certain types of mass protests
on regime change. First, only popular protests with a clear goal of regime change affect the
establishment of EA. Second, strategies employed by uprisings also seem to matter: Nonviolent
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anti-regime uprisings are associated with a greater likelihood of multiparty transitions in
authoritarian regimes than violent uprisings. This study also provides compelling evidence
for the strong influence of international factors on EA’s emergence. The end of the Cold War
and the regional diffusion of multiparty elections improve prospects for transitions to electoral
authoritarianism. Greater aid dependence also prompts such transitions, but only following
the Cold War period. The results indicate that authoritarian elites adopt multiparty elections
in response to pressures both from below and from outside.
One interesting question for future research is whether the mode of transition to EA
affects electoral outcomes, electoral conduct and quality, duration of EA regime, and prospects
for democratization. Although this study focuses on pressure from below, multiple pathways
and multiple combinations of actors and strategies can lead to the establishment of EA.
Considering that opposition actors have overcome obstacles to mobilizing and coordinating
popular support, competitive elections adopted in response to popular threats would have,
on average, a greater electoral competitiveness and a higher rate of leadership turnover than
competitive elections voluntarily introduced by authoritarian elites.
As discussed above, widespread and sustained popular protests also trigger democra-
tization. Another important remaining question is thus when do popular protests produce
democratization rather than EA transition? Levitsky and Way (2010) emphasize that the
international linkage and leverage provide conditions favorable for democratization. If this
argument is correct, anti-regime protests will be more likely to prompt democratization
than transition to EA in countries that are highly integrated with the West. Where such
favorable international conditions are absent, regime actors are better adept at manipulating
elections to thwart opposition challenges, and protest-driven transitions will fall short of
democratization. Future studies could test this expectation.
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Figure 1. Autocratic leadership and regime failure rates by anti-regime uprisings in the
previous year. Uprisings are measured from Chenoweth and Lewis (2013), leadership turnovers
from the Archigos dataset (Goemans, Gleditsch, & Chiozza, 2009), and autocratic regime
failures from Geddes et al. (2014).
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Figure 2. Dictators’ turnover mode and their post-tenure fate. Electoral turnovers from
Hyde and Marinov (2012) and other types of leader turnovers and post-tenure fates from
the Archigos dataset
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Figure 3. Uprisings around political reform. Year 0 corresponds to the year of
transition. I regress the number of each type of uprisings on 21 binary indicators of
years around a transition to electoral authoritarianism, {t−10, t−9, . . . , t+9, t+10}.
All other autocratic country-years are set to zero. I plot estimated coefficients on
these 21 dummy variables (line) and 95% confidence intervals (shaded area).
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Figure 4. Falsification Tests. Dots show the coefficient estimates on each variable,
and vertical lines display the 95% confidence intervals. The “sum of lags” reports
the sum of three lags’ coefficients.
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Figure 5. Substantive impact of anti-regime uprisings on the probability of EA transitions at
different values of each variable. High: the 90th percentile of a continuous variable or the value one of
a discrete variable and Low: the 10th percentile of a continuous variable or the value zero of a discrete
variable. Dots display the first differences, and vertical lines present the 95% confidence intervals.
First difference is defined as Pr(Transition = 1 |Uprising = 3)−Pr(Transition = 1 |Uprising = 0).
I set all the other covariates to the values observed for each observation, and obtain average effects.
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Uprising types
Violent Nonviolent Violent Nonviolent
No uprising Other Other Anti-regime Anti-regime Total
No transition 2795 195 52 317 92 3451
(98.3%) (96.1%) (100.0%) (94.3%) (86.0%) (97.4)
EA transition 49 8 0 19 15 91
(1.7%) (3.9%) (0.0%) (5.7%) (14.0%) (2.6)
Total 2844 203 52 336 107 3542
EA transitions are divided
Transition without 38 8 0 15 9 70
irregular leader change (1.3%) (3.9%) (0.0%) (4.5%) (8.4%) (2.0)
Transition with 11 0 0 4 6 21
irregular leader change (0.4%) (0.0%) (0.0%) (1.2%) (5.6%) (0.6)
Table 1. EA transitions and popular uprising in closed authoritarian regimes (1946–2006). Conditional
probabilities are in parentheses. P-values of χ2 test < 0.001.
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Multiply imputed
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Anti-regime uprising 0.468*** 0.367*** 0.362*** 0.472*** 0.451***
(0.090) (0.112) (0.118) (0.113) (0.110)
Other uprising 0.050 0.100 0.104 0.098 0.099
(0.129) (0.119) (0.118) (0.125) (0.123)
ln(Regime age) -0.300***-0.376***-0.275** -0.291** -0.135
(0.106) (0.118) (0.114) (0.118) (0.110)
Linear trend 0.023** 0.030 0.036 0.033 0.041*
(0.011) (0.022) (0.022) (0.021) (0.021)
GDP per capita -0.062 0.477** -0.040 0.454**
(0.155) (0.192) (0.152) (0.185)
Economic growth -0.011 -0.015 -0.028* -0.030*
(0.014) (0.016) (0.015) (0.016)
Neighboring democracies 1.391*** 1.350*** 1.160*** 1.245***
(0.395) (0.434) (0.430) (0.422)
Neighboring EAs 0.762* 0.783* 0.928** 1.323***
(0.415) (0.403) (0.395) (0.370)
Post-Cold War -5.718***-6.722** -5.195*** -7.120***
(1.857) (2.780) (1.763) (2.260)
ln(Aid per capita) -0.240 -0.357 -0.047 -0.265
(0.242) (0.343) (0.233) (0.278)
Post-Cold*Aid 1.355*** 1.550*** 1.193*** 1.535***
(0.396) (0.598) (0.372) (0.471)
Prior liberalization 4.254** 5.355***
(1.723) (1.732)
Coercive capacity -1.778** -1.917***
(0.758) (0.679)
Elite unrest 0.456 0.718***
(0.281) (0.277)
Irregular leader change 0.008 0.200
(0.359) (0.333)
Constant -3.410***-2.345 -1.918 -3.865** -2.771
(0.361) (1.703) (2.403) (1.717) (2.169)
Anti-regime=Others (p-value) 0.01 0.06 0.07 0.02 0.02
N 3542 2363 2094 3030 3030
Countries 128 97 92 124 124
Years 47-06 61-06 61-06 61-06 61-06
Transitions 91 71 67 77 77
Log-Likelihood -397.20 -278.17 -249.31 . .
Table 2. Logit estimates of EA transitions. Robust standard errors clustered at the country level
are in parentheses: *p < 0.1, **p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01. Models 4 and 5 use ten multiply-imputed
datasets.
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Multiply imputed
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Nonviolent anti-regime uprising 1.136*** 1.096*** 0.951*** 1.275*** 1.164***
(0.185) (0.175) (0.179) (0.180) (0.196)
Violent anti-regime uprising 0.302*** 0.186 0.200 0.240* 0.252**
(0.097) (0.123) (0.135) (0.124) (0.123)
Nonviolent other uprising -0.652 -0.672 -0.962 -0.819 -1.203
(0.711) (0.771) (0.859) (0.795) (0.966)
Violent other uprising 0.067 0.095 0.168 0.120 0.181
(0.139) (0.143) (0.118) (0.147) (0.120)
Controls no short full short full
Nonviolent anti-regime = <0.01 <0.01 <0.01 <0.01 <0.01
Violent anti-regime (p-value)
N 3542 2363 2094 3030 3030
Log-Likelihood -388.30 -270.80 -243.81 . .
Table 3. Differentiating between nonviolent and violent uprisings. Robust standard errors clustered
at the country level are in parentheses: *p < 0.1, **p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01. Models 4 and 5 use
ten multiply-imputed datasets. Short controls: controls in Model 2 of Table 2, and full controls:
controls in Model 3 of Table 2.
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(1) (2)
Without With Without With
Irregular leader change
Anti-regime uprising 0.374*** 0.782***
(0.118) (0.267)
Other uprising 0.160 -13.081***
(0.112) (0.843)
Nonviolent anti-regime uprising 1.055*** 1.632***
(0.207) (0.353)
Violent anti-regime uprising 0.197 0.481*
(0.132) (0.248)
Nonviolent other uprising -1.035 -15.155***
(0.921) (1.150)
Violent other uprising 0.229* -11.445***
(0.118) (0.635)
Controls full full
Anti-regime=Others (p-value) 0.10 <0.01
Nonviolent anti-regime=Violent anti-regime (p-value) <0.01 <0.01
N 3030 3030
Table 4. Distinguishing EA transitions with and without leadership turnover (multinomial logit
estimates). Robust standard errors clustered at the country level are in parentheses: *p < 0.1,
**p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01. Results are from 10 multiply imputed datasets.
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Supporting Appendix
to the paper
Anti-regime Uprisings and the Emergence of Electoral
Authoritarianism
(not for publication)
This document presents the results of statistical models that I conducted but, due to space
constraints, was not able to report in the paper.
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A-1
1 Summary statistics
This section presents descriptive statistics.
• Table A1 provides summary statistics on variables used in the analysis.
• Figure A1 displays the yearly evolution of political regimes from 1945 until 2012.
Closed authoritarian regimes, including non-electoral and single-party regimes, were
the most common type during the period of Cold War, yet declined after the 1980s.
The proportion of electoral autocracies, along with democracies, has increased since the
end of the Cold War era, such that they are the modal type of authoritarian regime. In
2012, 21% of the country-year observations were electoral autocracies, and 62% were
democracies.
• Table A2 reports the regime transition matrix that shows relative stability of the
different authoritarian regimes as well as their patterns of regime transitions. The
matrix shows that EA is the least stable and that a transition from closed autocracies
to EA is the main pathway to EA.
A-2
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max Median
EA transition 3030 .03 .16 0 1 0
Anti-regime uprising 3030 .31 .87 0 6 0
Other uprising 3030 .27 .97 0 9 0
Nonviolent anti-regime uprising 3030 .05 .3 0 3 0
Violent anti-regime uprising 3030 .27 .8 0 4 0
Nonviolent other uprising 3030 .03 .27 0 3 0
Violent other uprising 3030 .24 .93 0 9 0
Anti-government demos 2704 .33 1.02 0 14.33 0
Prior liberalization 2688 .11 .06 .02 .39 .1
Coercive capacity 2791 2.86 .41 2.33 4.46 2.76
New/Unstable regime 2847 .17 .38 0 1 0
Elite unrest 3030 .19 .39 0 1 0
Irregular leader change 2846 .16 .36 0 1 0
GDP per capita 2794 7.51 .92 5.33 10.67 7.35
Economic growth 2794 1.39 7 -61.49 76.85 1.56
Neighboring democracies 2970 .18 .27 0 1 0
Neighboring EAs 2970 .14 .27 0 1 0
Post-Cold War 3030 .2 .4 0 1 0
ln(Aid per capita) 2476 4.69 .56 3.64 7.71 4.58
ln(Regime age) 3030 3.28 1.24 0 5.33 3.18
Linear trend 3030 20.93 11.62 1 46 20
ln(Oil income per capita) 2857 2.49 3.22 0 11.37 .03
Inequality 2197 .42 .11 .16 .7 .41
Trade openness 2545 4.01 .78 .08 6.43 4.11
ELF 2707 .42 .3 0 .93 .38
Religious fractionalization 2624 .38 .22 0 .78 .44
Ethnical fragmentation 2688 .52 .26 0 .93 .59
Ethnic wars 2647 .14 .35 0 1 0
Table A1. Summary statistics
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Figure A1. Regime types across time from 1946 to 2012. I use Skaaning et
al.’s (2015) measures of democracy and multiparty elections to classify regimes.
See the Data section for details.
.
t
t− 1 Closed EA Demo. Total
Closed 95.3 2.8 1.9 100.0
(3,792) (112) (74) (3,978)
EA 6.1 90.4 3.6 100.0
(85) (1,267) (50) (1,402)
Demo. 1.2 0.6 98.3 100.0
(51) (24) (4,256) (4,331)
Table A2. Regime transition matrix, 1946–2012.
Numbers in parentheses are frequencies. See the
Data section for the details of regime type mea-
sures.
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2 List of EA transitions and Anti-regime Uprisings, 1946–2006
NAVCO anti-regime uprising=1
(in the past three years)
Albania 1990
Algeria 1996
Angola 1991
Burundi 1992
Cambodia 1992
Chad 1996
Chile 1988
Congo Brazzaville 2001
Djibouti 1992
Dominican Republic 1965
Egypt 2004
El Salvador 1981
Ethiopia 1993
Guatemala 1965
Guatemala 1984
Kenya 1991
Korea, South 1962
Korea, South 1980
Liberia 1996
Maldives 2004
Nigeria 1998
Pakistan 1984
Peru 1994
Portugal 1974
Romania 1989
Sierra Leone 1995
Sudan 2004
Tanzania 1994
Thailand 1978
Thailand 2006
Uganda 2005
Vietnam, South 1960
Zimbabwe 1978
N=34
NAVCO anti-regime uprising=0
CNTS anti-govt. demonstration=1
(in the past three years)
Bolivia 1951
Burkina Faso 1997
Comoros 1991
Comoros 2001
Congo, Democratic Republic 2005
Cote d’Ivoire 1999
Cuba 1954
El Salvador 1966
Gabon 1992
Haiti 1950
Haiti 1989
Indonesia 1972
Liberia 1984
Malaysia 1970
Mexico 1952
Pakistan 1964
Panama 1951
Philippines 1980
Syria 1953
Togo 1992
Yugoslavia 1991
N=21
A-5
NAVCO anti-regime uprising=0
CNTS anti-govt. demonstration=0
(in the past three years)
Azerbaijan 1991
Bangladesh 1972
Bangladesh 1978
Bolivia 1966
Burkina Faso 1977
Cambodia 1955
Cameroon 1989
Central African Republic 2004
China 1946
Congo Brazzaville 1991
Cote d’Ivoire 1989
Dominican Republic 1946
El Salvador 1949
Equatorial Guinea 1992
Gambia 1996
Georgia 1994
Ghana 1991
Guinea 1994
Indonesia 1954
Kenya 1965
Kyrgyzstan 1994
Lesotho 1997
Liberia 1954
Mauritania 1991
Mauritania 2006
Mauritania 2008
Nicaragua 1956
Nicaragua 1971
Panama 1982
Paraguay 1962
Poland 1946
Romania 1945
Rwanda 2002
Senegal 1977
Sierra Leone 1967
Suriname 1986
Tanzania 1962
Thailand 1945
Thailand 1947
Thailand 1951
Tunisia 1998
Turkey 1945
USSR 1989
Uganda 1966
Uzbekistan 1993
Yemen, North 1989
N=46
A-6
3 Summarizing conceptions related to electoral autocracies
Table A3 provides the summary of notions related to electoral autocracies.
Multiparty Electoral Competitive
autocracies authoritarianism authoritarianism
Institutional attributes
Multiparty elections
3 3 3for the national legislature
Multiparty elections
3 3for the national executive
Universal suffrage
3 3 3
Civilian controls
3
Meaningful level of competition 3
Democratic boundary
Procedural integrity of elections 3 3 3
Substantive democratic qualities ? 3
Scholars Magaloni et al. Schedler Levitsky and Way
Hadenius and Teorell
Table A3. Summary of electoral authoritarian regime concepts.
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4 Presenting Full Results
Tables A4 through A6 reports the full estimation results of Tables 3 and 4 and Figure 5 in
the main text.
A-8
Multiply imputed
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Nonviolent anti-regime uprising 1.136*** 1.096*** 0.951*** 1.275*** 1.164***
(0.185) (0.175) (0.179) (0.180) (0.196)
Violent anti-regime uprising 0.302*** 0.186 0.200 0.240* 0.252**
(0.097) (0.123) (0.135) (0.124) (0.123)
Nonviolent other uprising -0.652 -0.672 -0.962 -0.819 -1.203
(0.711) (0.771) (0.859) (0.795) (0.966)
Violent other uprising 0.067 0.095 0.168 0.120 0.181
(0.139) (0.143) (0.118) (0.147) (0.120)
ln(Regime age) -0.342***-0.395***-0.290***-0.335*** -0.173
(0.105) (0.113) (0.113) (0.115) (0.109)
Linear trend 0.025** 0.027 0.032 0.030 0.035*
(0.011) (0.022) (0.022) (0.021) (0.021)
GDP per capita -0.210 0.324 -0.189 0.285
(0.163) (0.214) (0.156) (0.209)
Economic growth -0.012 -0.015 -0.029* -0.031*
(0.015) (0.017) (0.016) (0.017)
Neighboring democracies 1.193*** 1.209*** 0.981** 1.126***
(0.391) (0.424) (0.420) (0.421)
Neighboring EAs 0.797* 0.753* 1.060** 1.391***
(0.430) (0.407) (0.414) (0.390)
Post-Cold War -5.587***-6.225** -4.772*** -6.507***
(1.874) (2.899) (1.778) (2.353)
ln(Aid per capita) -0.116 -0.237 0.107 -0.133
(0.235) (0.337) (0.228) (0.277)
Post-Cold*Aid 1.364*** 1.501** 1.139*** 1.462***
(0.392) (0.614) (0.367) (0.480)
Prior liberalization 4.186** 5.528***
(1.718) (1.687)
Coercive capacity -1.737** -1.705**
(0.766) (0.679)
Elite unrest 0.529* 0.835***
(0.291) (0.290)
Irregular leader change -0.025 0.101
(0.354) (0.320)
Constant -3.326***-1.727 -1.388 -3.307* -2.581
(0.337) (1.711) (2.348) (1.727) (2.142)
Nonviolent=Violent (p-value) 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
N 3542 2363 2094 3030 3030
Log-Likelihood -388.30 -270.80 -243.81 . .
Table A4. Presenting the full estimation results of Table 2. Robust standard errors clustered at
the country level are in parentheses: *p < 0.1, **p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01.
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(1) (2)
Without With Without With
Irregular leader change
Anti-regime uprising 0.374*** 0.782***
(0.118) (0.267)
Other uprising 0.160 -13.081***
(0.112) (0.843)
Nonviolent anti-regime uprising 1.055*** 1.632***
(0.207) (0.353)
Violent anti-regime uprising 0.197 0.481*
(0.132) (0.248)
Nonviolent other uprising -1.035 -15.155***
(0.921) (1.150)
Violent other uprising 0.229* -11.445***
(0.118) (0.635)
Prior liberalization 4.583*** 9.848** 4.874*** 8.877**
(1.713) (4.828) (1.712) (4.268)
Coercive capacity -2.455*** -0.469 -2.286*** -0.078
(0.681) (1.343) (0.705) (1.163)
Elite unrest 0.553* 1.455** 0.615** 1.735***
(0.297) (0.713) (0.303) (0.664)
GDP per capita 0.381* 0.677* 0.245 0.395
(0.199) (0.402) (0.219) (0.403)
Economic growth -0.028 -0.044 -0.028 -0.043
(0.018) (0.032) (0.018) (0.034)
Neighboring democracies 0.814 2.338** 0.700 2.200**
(0.509) (0.990) (0.507) (0.956)
Neighboring EAs 1.407*** 1.056 1.455*** 1.154
(0.414) (0.942) (0.426) (0.950)
Post-Cold War -7.494*** -2.738 -6.729*** -3.703
(2.463) (6.031) (2.573) (5.695)
ln(Aid per capita) -0.151 -0.657 -0.032 -0.417
(0.297) (0.716) (0.290) (0.757)
Post-Cold*Aid 1.662*** 0.459 1.553*** 0.726
(0.501) (1.277) (0.518) (1.206)
ln(Regime age) -0.003 -0.605** -0.038 -0.681***
(0.114) (0.270) (0.115) (0.261)
Linear trend 0.038* 0.032 0.032 0.029
(0.022) (0.053) (0.022) (0.049)
Constant -1.655 -8.025 -1.564 -7.906
(2.051) (5.611) (2.080) (5.687)
Anti-regime=Others (p-value) 0.10 <0.01
Nonviolent anti-regime=Violent anti-regime (p-value) <0.01 <0.01
N 3030 3030
Table A5. Presenting the full estimation results of Table 3 (multinomial logit estimates). Robust
standard errors clustered at the country level are in parentheses: *p < 0.1, **p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01.
Results are from 10 multiply imputed datasets.A-10
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Anti-regime uprising 0.166 0.299* 0.400*** 0.768*** 1.140*** 0.826*** 0.654***
(0.153) (0.157) (0.148) (0.208) (0.260) (0.190) (0.111)
Other uprising 0.345 0.671* 0.561 0.114 0.905 -0.311 -0.204
(0.492) (0.404) (0.473) (1.351) (0.965) (0.962) (0.964)
Anti-regime uprising×Neighboring democracies 0.940***
(0.308)
Other uprising×Neighboring democracies 0.363
(0.943)
Anti-regime uprising×Elite unrest 0.162
(0.162)
Other uprising×Elite unrest -1.075
(0.947)
Anti-regime uprising×Irregular leader change -0.138
(0.213)
Other uprising×Irregular leader change -0.687
(0.827)
Anti-regime uprising×ELF -0.765**
(0.341)
Other uprising×ELF 0.313
(2.010)
Anti-regime uprising×Ethnical fragmentation -1.267***
(0.402)
Other uprising×Ethnical fragmentation -0.450
(1.799)
Anti-regime uprising×Religious fractionalization -1.168**
(0.454)
Other uprising×Religious fractionalization 1.484
(2.069)
Anti-regime uprising×Ethnic wars -0.678**
(0.303)
Other uprising×Ethnic wars 0.614
(1.165)
Neighboring democracies 0.500 1.309*** 1.303*** 1.563*** 1.414*** 1.442*** 1.304***
(0.559) (0.438) (0.440) (0.441) (0.448) (0.448) (0.421)
Elite unrest 0.355 0.423 0.412 0.377 0.511* 0.330 0.306
(0.294) (0.355) (0.280) (0.283) (0.282) (0.280) (0.282)
Irregular leader change 0.106 0.001 0.249 -0.132 -0.044 -0.170 -0.088
(0.365) (0.357) (0.429) (0.381) (0.354) (0.391) (0.373)
ELF 1.032*
(0.584)
Ethnical fragmentation 0.692
(0.670)
Religious fractionalization 0.825
(0.936)
Ethnic wars 0.454
(0.756)
N 2094 2094 2094 2031 1997 2016 2033
Log-Likelihood -245.42 -248.13 -248.62 -239.01 -237.91 -236.27 -238.21
Table A6. Presenting the full estimation results of models summarized in Figure 5. ELF: Ethno-
linguistic fractionalization index. Robust standard errors clustered at the country level are in
parentheses: *p < 0.1, **p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01.
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5 Using Alternative EA Measures
Table A7 reports the estimation results of models in which I use alternative measures of
electoral authoritarian regimes. Model 1 of Table A7 includes only EA transitions in which
EA was maintained at least for three years. This removes short-lived cases (5 cases) including
democratizing cases after the adoption of multiparty elections. In order to demarcate
autocracies from democracies, Model 2 uses the democracy measure from Boix et al. (2013)
and Model 3 from Geddes et al. (2014) instead of the COMPETITION variable from Skaaning
et al. (2015). In their coding of democracy, these datasets explicitly consider electoral quality
using multiple sources of information on elections rather than focusing only on election
outcomes while holding a procedural definition of democracy. For instance, Boix et al. (2013,
p.1531) define “elections as free if voters are given multiple options on ballots and as fair
if electoral fraud is absent and incumbents do not abuse government power to effectively
eliminate the chance of opposition victory through peaceful contestation.” Similarly, Geddes
et al. (2014) consider an election uncompetitive under the following conditions: “if one or
more large party is not allowed to participate; and/or if there are widespread reports of
violence, jailing, and/or intimidation of opposition leaders or supporters; and/or if there are
credible reports of vote fraud widespread enough to change election outcome (especially if
reported by international observers); and/or if the incumbent so dominates political resources
and the media that observers do not consider elections fair.” The results are not sensitive to
alternative measures of electoral authoritarianism.
A-12
Remaining Democracy measure Remaining Democracy measure
3 years BMR GWF 3 years BMR GWF
Anti-regime uprising 0.271** 0.319*** 0.326**
(0.107) (0.119) (0.129)
Other uprising 0.064 0.148 0.137
(0.102) (0.127) (0.111)
Nonviolent anti-regime uprising 0.650*** 0.743*** 0.670***
(0.219) (0.185) (0.219)
Violent anti-regime uprising 0.173 0.184 0.236
(0.129) (0.135) (0.145)
Prior liberalization 2.310 5.407*** 4.545** 1.735 4.850*** 4.221**
(1.751) (1.776) (1.961) (1.770) (1.745) (1.932)
Coercive capacity -1.877** -1.751** -1.447** -1.731** -1.616** -1.354**
(0.823) (0.736) (0.717) (0.801) (0.704) (0.687)
Elite unrest 0.446 0.521* 0.319 0.458 0.523* 0.334
(0.290) (0.281) (0.291) (0.292) (0.291) (0.293)
Irregular leader change 0.242 0.066 0.072 0.227 0.034 0.049
(0.385) (0.351) (0.364) (0.385) (0.344) (0.358)
GDP per capita -0.009 0.396* 0.327* -0.107 0.271 0.239
(0.213) (0.203) (0.184) (0.224) (0.216) (0.196)
Economic growth -0.027 -0.011 -0.006 -0.026 -0.010 -0.005
(0.024) (0.015) (0.015) (0.024) (0.016) (0.015)
Neighboring democracies 0.786 1.415*** 1.249*** 0.672 1.250*** 1.156**
(0.491) (0.454) (0.445) (0.507) (0.436) (0.460)
Neighboring EAs 0.387 0.891** 0.721* 0.348 0.832* 0.728*
(0.469) (0.410) (0.388) (0.472) (0.438) (0.418)
Post-Cold War -3.968 -7.531** -6.433** -4.662* -8.258*** -7.029**
(2.460) (2.942) (2.728) (2.425) (2.962) (2.870)
ln(Aid per capita) 0.032 -0.534 -0.252 0.031 -0.548 -0.279
(0.379) (0.361) (0.358) (0.364) (0.349) (0.368)
Post-Cold*Aid 1.037** 1.618** 1.547*** 1.194** 1.799*** 1.682***
(0.521) (0.635) (0.578) (0.509) (0.632) (0.597)
Linear trend 0.001 0.061*** 0.023 0.001 0.058*** 0.022
(0.023) (0.021) (0.022) (0.023) (0.021) (0.022)
ln(Regime age) 0.395*** -0.312** -0.326* 0.386*** -0.333** -0.338*
(0.082) (0.143) (0.174) (0.083) (0.145) (0.178)
Constant -1.186 -1.122 -1.870 -0.693 -0.227 -1.199
(2.614) (2.609) (2.438) (2.537) (2.660) (2.519)
N 2779 2024 2005 2779 2024 2005
Log-Likelihood -268.12 -248.78 -239.48 -266.56 -246.42 -238.53
Table A7. Alternative measures of electoral authoritarianism (logit estimates). BMR: Boix et al.
(2013) and GWF: Geddes et al. (2014). Robust standard errors clustered at the country level are in
parentheses: *p < 0.1, **p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01.
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6 Using Alternative Measures of Popular Protest
Tables A8 through A11 examine whether the central findings are robust to alternative codings
of popular uprisings. In the main text, I use a sum of uprisings in the previous three years.
Tables A8 and A10 use a five-year sum of popular uprisings. Tables A9 and A11 use a binary
indicator of whether each type of popular uprisings has occurred in the past. They apply
three different time windows: one-year, three-year, and five-year. The results show that the
main finding is robust to different measures of popular uprisings.
Tables A12 and A13 use anti-government demonstrations taken from Cross-National
Time-Series (CNTS) Data Archive (Banks & Wilson, 2013) instead of the NAVCO dataset.
Anti-government demonstration is defined as “any peaceful public gathering of at least 100
people for the primary purpose of displaying or voicing their opposition to government policies
or authority, excluding demonstrations of a distinctly anti-foreign nature” (Banks & Wilson,
2013). Accordingly, the CNTS data identifies dissident activities of smaller scale than the
NAVCO data. Table A12 uses a sum, a logged sum, and a binary indicator of anti-government
demonstrations in the past three years. Table A13 uses a five-year time frame instead of a
three-year frame. I find that anti-government demonstration are significantly associated with
EA transition.
A-14
5-year sum
(1) (2) (3)
Anti-regime uprising 0.289*** 0.237*** 0.238***
(0.066) (0.074) (0.079)
Other uprising 0.027 0.034 0.036
(0.092) (0.079) (0.081)
ln(Regime age) -0.343***-0.348***-0.238**
(0.121) (0.124) (0.118)
Linear trend 0.048*** 0.034 0.039*
(0.013) (0.023) (0.024)
GDP per capita -0.110 0.411**
(0.167) (0.203)
Economic growth -0.004 -0.008
(0.013) (0.017)
Neighboring democracies 1.452*** 1.368***
(0.399) (0.438)
Neighboring EAs 0.669 0.761*
(0.438) (0.424)
Post-Cold War -6.854***-7.640***
(1.916) (2.891)
ln(Aid per capita) -0.307 -0.413
(0.263) (0.366)
Post-Cold*Aid 1.565*** 1.715***
(0.409) (0.623)
Prior liberalization 4.211**
(1.798)
Coercive capacity -1.592**
(0.746)
Elite unrest 0.520*
(0.282)
Irregular leader change 0.084
(0.360)
Constant -4.049***-1.807 -1.846
(0.457) (1.874) (2.586)
N 2949 2306 2053
Log-Likelihood -312.94 -265.99 -238.76
Table A8. Using a 5-year sum of popular uprisings 1.
Robust standard errors clustered at the country level are in
parentheses: *p < 0.1, **p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01.
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One-year lag 3-year period 5-year period
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Anti-regime uprising 1.290*** 0.941*** 0.875*** 1.370*** 1.046*** 1.049*** 1.393*** 1.069*** 1.129***
(0.285) (0.323) (0.337) (0.296) (0.314) (0.330) (0.301) (0.328) (0.339)
Other uprising 0.548 0.378 0.302 0.416 0.420 0.307 0.249 0.400 0.292
(0.475) (0.476) (0.478) (0.409) (0.411) (0.438) (0.361) (0.378) (0.400)
ln(Regime age) -0.382*** -0.368*** -0.265** -0.374*** -0.370*** -0.269** -0.339*** -0.350*** -0.244**
(0.114) (0.117) (0.114) (0.116) (0.119) (0.114) (0.117) (0.122) (0.117)
Linear trend 0.052*** 0.031 0.038* 0.051*** 0.032 0.036* 0.049*** 0.037* 0.039*
(0.012) (0.021) (0.021) (0.013) (0.021) (0.022) (0.013) (0.022) (0.023)
GDP per capita -0.095 0.439** -0.035 0.500*** -0.067 0.458**
(0.156) (0.196) (0.154) (0.184) (0.167) (0.194)
Economic growth -0.009 -0.013 -0.009 -0.011 -0.000 -0.003
(0.015) (0.017) (0.013) (0.015) (0.013) (0.017)
Neighboring democracies 1.363*** 1.300*** 1.322*** 1.252*** 1.369*** 1.217***
(0.399) (0.436) (0.387) (0.430) (0.399) (0.445)
Neighboring EAs 0.784* 0.796* 0.840* 0.855** 0.813* 0.889**
(0.423) (0.412) (0.431) (0.415) (0.455) (0.438)
Post-Cold War -5.743*** -6.882** -5.781*** -6.837** -6.960*** -7.774***
(1.848) (2.740) (1.846) (2.766) (1.857) (2.763)
ln(Aid per capita) -0.260 -0.412 -0.206 -0.316 -0.222 -0.329
(0.247) (0.351) (0.243) (0.341) (0.261) (0.364)
Post-Cold*Aid 1.358*** 1.582*** 1.353*** 1.565*** 1.569*** 1.733***
(0.394) (0.590) (0.392) (0.596) (0.395) (0.596)
Prior liberalization 4.114** 4.086** 4.285**
(1.695) (1.729) (1.810)
Coercive capacity -1.743** -1.788** -1.620**
(0.730) (0.728) (0.714)
Elite unrest 0.474* 0.453 0.537*
(0.283) (0.276) (0.274)
Irregular leader change 0.043 0.022 0.045
(0.371) (0.347) (0.349)
Constant -4.047*** -2.032 -1.488 -4.116*** -2.808* -2.285 -4.215*** -2.693 -2.604
(0.421) (1.750) (2.436) (0.420) (1.703) (2.386) (0.461) (1.908) (2.607)
N 3030 2363 2094 3030 2363 2094 2949 2306 2053
Log-Likelihood -326.04 -279.31 -250.81 -322.62 -276.92 -248.26 -308.52 -264.14 -236.80
Table A9. Using binary measures of popular uprisings 1. Robust standard errors clustered at the country
level are in parentheses: *p < 0.1, **p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01.
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5-year sum
(1) (2) (3)
Nonviolent anti-regime uprising 0.858*** 0.783*** 0.663***
(0.138) (0.124) (0.138)
Violent anti-regime uprising 0.190*** 0.132* 0.145*
(0.069) (0.079) (0.085)
ln(Regime age) -0.407***-0.374***-0.267**
(0.112) (0.119) (0.117)
Linear trend 0.050*** 0.034 0.037
(0.012) (0.023) (0.023)
GDP per capita -0.252 0.251
(0.170) (0.210)
Economic growth -0.002 -0.005
(0.015) (0.017)
Neighboring democracies 1.225*** 1.167***
(0.406) (0.432)
Neighboring EAs 0.687 0.691
(0.460) (0.462)
Post-Cold War -7.419***-8.506***
(1.938) (2.855)
ln(Aid per capita) -0.211 -0.351
(0.252) (0.337)
Post-Cold*Aid 1.695*** 1.924***
(0.405) (0.605)
Prior liberalization 3.774**
(1.753)
Coercive capacity -1.398*
(0.723)
Elite unrest 0.543*
(0.293)
Irregular leader change 0.047
(0.355)
Constant -3.919***-1.127 -1.272
(0.418) (1.749) (2.433)
N 2949 2306 2053
Log-Likelihood -302.79 -258.20 -234.06
Table A10. Using a 5-year sum of popular uprisings 2. Robust
standard errors clustered at the country level are in parentheses:
*p < 0.1, **p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01.
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One-year lag 3-year period 5-year period
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Nonviolent anti-regime uprising 2.093*** 1.882*** 1.408*** 2.228*** 1.988*** 1.668*** 0.858*** 0.783*** 0.663***
(0.331) (0.350) (0.391) (0.303) (0.309) (0.380) (0.138) (0.124) (0.138)
Violent anti-regime uprising 0.928*** 0.560 0.577 0.780*** 0.479 0.540 0.190*** 0.132* 0.145*
(0.302) (0.358) (0.391) (0.274) (0.315) (0.350) (0.069) (0.079) (0.085)
ln(Regime age) -0.407*** -0.382*** -0.277** -0.435*** -0.388*** -0.301*** -0.407*** -0.374*** -0.267**
(0.111) (0.112) (0.114) (0.105) (0.109) (0.111) (0.112) (0.119) (0.117)
Linear trend 0.052*** 0.028 0.036* 0.054*** 0.030 0.034 0.050*** 0.034 0.037
(0.012) (0.021) (0.021) (0.011) (0.021) (0.022) (0.012) (0.023) (0.023)
GDP per capita -0.178 0.368* -0.160 0.388** -0.252 0.251
(0.155) (0.199) (0.150) (0.195) (0.170) (0.210)
Economic growth -0.011 -0.015 -0.010 -0.011 -0.002 -0.005
(0.015) (0.017) (0.014) (0.016) (0.015) (0.017)
Neighboring democracies 1.286*** 1.247*** 1.102*** 1.102*** 1.225*** 1.167***
(0.403) (0.442) (0.390) (0.426) (0.406) (0.432)
Neighboring EAs 0.786* 0.759* 0.894** 0.827* 0.687 0.691
(0.423) (0.417) (0.433) (0.423) (0.460) (0.462)
Post-Cold War -5.904*** -7.286*** -5.937*** -7.425*** -7.419*** -8.506***
(1.815) (2.757) (1.831) (2.718) (1.938) (2.855)
ln(Aid per capita) -0.229 -0.426 -0.169 -0.333 -0.211 -0.351
(0.237) (0.337) (0.238) (0.333) (0.252) (0.337)
Post-Cold*Aid 1.415*** 1.689*** 1.417*** 1.734*** 1.695*** 1.924***
(0.383) (0.590) (0.386) (0.583) (0.405) (0.605)
Prior liberalization 3.778** 3.313* 3.774**
(1.659) (1.798) (1.753)
Coercive capacity -1.683** -1.694** -1.398*
(0.698) (0.696) (0.723)
Elite unrest 0.487* 0.560** 0.543*
(0.282) (0.274) (0.293)
Irregular leader change 0.016 -0.079 0.047
(0.361) (0.343) (0.355)
Constant -3.913*** -1.427 -0.905 -3.966*** -1.912 -1.359 -3.919*** -1.127 -1.272
(0.415) (1.713) (2.442) (0.388) (1.660) (2.362) (0.418) (1.749) (2.433)
N 3030 2363 2094 3030 2363 2094 2949 2306 2053
Log-Likelihood -324.72 -277.27 -250.25 -317.04 -272.47 -246.05 -302.79 -258.20 -234.06
Table A11. Using binary measures of popular uprisings 2. Robust standard errors clustered at the
country level are in parentheses: *p < 0.1, **p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01.
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Sum Logged sum Binary indiator
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Anti-government demos 0.094* 0.214** 0.182* 0.617*** 0.728** 0.696* 0.965*** 0.645** 0.528*
(0.056) (0.102) (0.110) (0.216) (0.311) (0.361) (0.213) (0.303) (0.313)
ln(Regime age) -0.296*** -0.298** -0.204* -0.307*** -0.294** -0.210* -0.306*** -0.301** -0.200*
(0.105) (0.122) (0.121) (0.102) (0.120) (0.119) (0.096) (0.120) (0.120)
Linear trend 0.029*** 0.032 0.043* 0.028*** 0.033 0.043* 0.030*** 0.037* 0.048**
(0.010) (0.022) (0.023) (0.010) (0.022) (0.023) (0.009) (0.022) (0.022)
GDP per capita -0.220 0.354* -0.218 0.345 -0.206 0.360*
(0.167) (0.212) (0.165) (0.212) (0.161) (0.207)
Economic growth -0.025 -0.027 -0.024 -0.026 -0.022 -0.026
(0.017) (0.019) (0.017) (0.019) (0.017) (0.019)
Neighboring democracies 1.170** 1.162** 1.122** 1.078** 1.181*** 1.137**
(0.467) (0.495) (0.455) (0.491) (0.458) (0.514)
Neighboring EAs 1.022** 1.045** 1.052** 1.102** 0.999** 1.009**
(0.427) (0.434) (0.436) (0.444) (0.432) (0.431)
Post-Cold War -6.516*** -7.576*** -6.548*** -7.970*** -6.711*** -8.095***
(1.801) (2.705) (1.789) (2.628) (1.857) (2.733)
ln(Aid per capita) -0.140 -0.275 -0.116 -0.229 -0.189 -0.341
(0.257) (0.353) (0.258) (0.351) (0.259) (0.352)
Post-Cold*Aid 1.502*** 1.722*** 1.501*** 1.802*** 1.511*** 1.809***
(0.364) (0.578) (0.362) (0.559) (0.375) (0.577)
Prior liberalization 3.938** 3.827** 3.543*
(1.894) (1.897) (1.860)
Coercive capacity -1.649** -1.635** -1.635**
(0.762) (0.758) (0.774)
Elite unrest 0.653** 0.662** 0.653**
(0.298) (0.298) (0.300)
Irregular leader change 0.185 0.134 0.159
(0.390) (0.393) (0.387)
Constant -3.341*** -1.806 -2.084 -3.392*** -2.017 -2.300 -3.637*** -1.864 -1.968
(0.346) (1.664) (2.455) (0.329) (1.693) (2.451) (0.333) (1.768) (2.527)
N 3255 2251 1983 3255 2251 1983 3255 2251 1983
Log-Likelihood -389.20 -261.71 -228.98 -386.55 -260.53 -227.95 -381.77 -260.64 -228.60
Table A12. Using Banks and Wilson measures of anti-regime demonstrations in the past three years. Robust
standard errors clustered at the country level are in parentheses: *p < 0.1, **p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01.
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Sum Logged sum Binary indiator
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Anti-government demos 0.169** 0.309** 0.281** 0.805*** 0.891*** 0.920** 0.979*** 0.670** 0.599*
(0.086) (0.127) (0.136) (0.256) (0.336) (0.382) (0.230) (0.310) (0.309)
ln(Regime age) -0.335*** -0.300** -0.201 -0.344*** -0.294** -0.205 -0.345*** -0.315** -0.205
(0.108) (0.125) (0.127) (0.104) (0.125) (0.125) (0.098) (0.125) (0.125)
Linear trend 0.029*** 0.030 0.040* 0.028*** 0.031 0.040 0.030*** 0.038* 0.047**
(0.010) (0.023) (0.024) (0.010) (0.023) (0.024) (0.009) (0.023) (0.024)
GDP per capita -0.277 0.291 -0.279 0.274 -0.268 0.302
(0.177) (0.215) (0.175) (0.216) (0.168) (0.210)
Economic growth -0.018 -0.020 -0.017 -0.019 -0.013 -0.016
(0.017) (0.020) (0.017) (0.019) (0.016) (0.020)
Neighboring democracies 1.231*** 1.202** 1.196*** 1.121** 1.277*** 1.185**
(0.459) (0.489) (0.449) (0.483) (0.455) (0.516)
Neighboring EAs 1.032** 1.055** 1.065** 1.115** 1.003** 0.993**
(0.429) (0.443) (0.436) (0.448) (0.448) (0.447)
Post-Cold War -7.048*** -7.967*** -7.136*** -8.430*** -7.361*** -8.491***
(1.866) (2.748) (1.871) (2.673) (1.966) (2.880)
ln(Aid per capita) -0.085 -0.218 -0.049 -0.142 -0.157 -0.309
(0.260) (0.362) (0.263) (0.363) (0.264) (0.363)
Post-Cold*Aid 1.595*** 1.785*** 1.602*** 1.880*** 1.614*** 1.861***
(0.381) (0.594) (0.383) (0.577) (0.400) (0.614)
Prior liberalization 4.092** 4.017** 3.616*
(1.969) (1.983) (1.962)
Coercive capacity -1.674** -1.682** -1.685**
(0.743) (0.754) (0.796)
Elite unrest 0.657** 0.664** 0.656**
(0.297) (0.298) (0.297)
Irregular leader change 0.147 0.091 0.122
(0.398) (0.396) (0.384)
Constant -3.246*** -1.567 -1.772 -3.324*** -1.837 -2.054 -3.644*** -1.555 -1.572
(0.376) (1.723) (2.487) (0.356) (1.767) (2.494) (0.347) (1.839) (2.605)
N 3002 2130 1886 3002 2130 1886 3002 2130 1886
Log-Likelihood -359.87 -250.18 -219.11 -356.50 -248.98 -217.87 -353.44 -249.38 -218.88
Table A13. Using Banks and Wilson measures of anti-regime demonstrations in the past five years. Robust
standard errors clustered at the country level are in parentheses: *p < 0.1, **p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01.
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7 Testing Alternative Model Specifications
This section examines whether the central findings are robust to different model specifications.
First, I attempt to control for country-unit effects and/or common temporal shocks. To
control for country-unit effects, I include country random effects or regional fixed effects. To
control for common shocks, I add year fixed effects. Table A14 shows that the estimates of
anti-regime uprisings are robust to the inclusion of these factors.
Second, Table A15 presents the estimates of models including additional socio-economic
variables: oil income per capita, inequality, and trade openness. I fail to find evidence that
these controls are significantly correlated with EA transitions. However, the estimates on
anti-regime uprisings remain robust.
Third, Table A16 examines how prior regime types influence the effect of mass uprisings.
I use regime types taken from Geddes et al. (2014) and include military regimes or party-based
regimes. Results remain similar.
Finally, I further examine whether the estimates I have reported are sensitive to adding
or deleting other control variables. Using the program developed by Young and Holsteen
(2015), I estimated 4,096 models, all possible combinations of controls, and store all of the
estimates on anti-regime uprisings. Figure A2 displays the distribution of all the estimates
on Anti-regime uprising. In every model, the estimated coefficient remains positive, ranging
from 0.27 to 0.54, and statistically significant at the 5% level. This demonstrates that the
main results are strongly robust to different model specifications.
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(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Anti-regime uprising 0.380*** 0.380*** 0.362*** 0.380***
(0.132) (0.143) (0.107) (0.115)
Other uprising 0.057 0.090 0.104 0.057
(0.150) (0.163) (0.138) (0.150)
Nonviolent anti-regime uprising 0.917*** 0.958*** 0.824*** 0.917***
(0.253) (0.250) (0.193) (0.222)
Violent anti-regime uprising 0.232 0.224 0.221* 0.232*
(0.146) (0.154) (0.124) (0.132)
Prior liberalization 3.715* 5.036** 4.254** 3.714* 2.988 4.425** 3.646* 2.987
(1.955) (2.020) (1.949) (2.051) (1.920) (2.007) (1.975) (2.083)
Coercive capacity -1.787** -1.511** -1.778*** -1.787*** -1.618** -1.364* -1.633*** -1.618***
(0.718) (0.749) (0.635) (0.635) (0.670) (0.711) (0.628) (0.628)
Elite unrest 0.396 0.534 0.456 0.396 0.392 0.533* 0.473 0.392
(0.299) (0.327) (0.295) (0.311) (0.304) (0.323) (0.297) (0.317)
Irregular leader change -0.001 -0.063 0.008 -0.001 -0.020 -0.082 -0.022 -0.020
(0.384) (0.428) (0.321) (0.337) (0.373) (0.404) (0.322) (0.340)
GDP per capita 0.572*** 0.593** 0.476** 0.572** 0.427** 0.408 0.339 0.427*
(0.209) (0.247) (0.218) (0.231) (0.216) (0.255) (0.222) (0.235)
Economic growth -0.025 -0.024 -0.015 -0.025 -0.022 -0.021 -0.014 -0.022
(0.021) (0.023) (0.018) (0.021) (0.022) (0.024) (0.019) (0.021)
Neighboring democracies 1.358*** 0.916 1.350*** 1.357*** 1.272*** 0.832 1.191*** 1.272***
(0.464) (0.646) (0.431) (0.463) (0.446) (0.599) (0.439) (0.471)
Neighboring EAs 0.886** 0.633 0.783* 0.885* 0.782 0.526 0.735 0.782
(0.450) (0.540) (0.467) (0.494) (0.484) (0.593) (0.479) (0.509)
Post-Cold War -8.026 -7.268 -6.722** -8.028 -5.646 -4.212 -7.588** -5.648
(14.535) (14.822) (3.300) (17.400) (15.381) (15.638) (3.312) (17.712)
ln(Aid per capita) -0.369 -0.089 -0.357 -0.369 -0.273 0.073 -0.331 -0.273
(0.340) (0.394) (0.441) (0.442) (0.322) (0.385) (0.437) (0.434)
Post-Cold*Aid 1.528*** 1.657** 1.550** 1.527** 1.691*** 1.795*** 1.760** 1.691**
(0.569) (0.673) (0.688) (0.717) (0.577) (0.675) (0.690) (0.717)
ln(Regime age) -0.280** -0.194 -0.275** -0.280** -0.305** -0.217* -0.293** -0.305**
(0.120) (0.132) (0.115) (0.121) (0.121) (0.129) (0.117) (0.124)
Linear trend 0.065 -0.025 0.036* 0.066 -0.147 -0.273 0.034* -0.147
(0.984) (0.987) (0.020) (1.166) (1.041) (1.043) (0.020) (1.192)
Constant -2.081 -0.840 -1.918 -2.085 4.875 7.234 -1.183 4.872
(30.791) (31.225) (2.825) (36.126) (32.536) (32.820) (2.783) (36.946)
lnsig2u -11.571 -12.723 -12.717 -11.055
(30.531) (19.903) (19.927) (20.233)
Region FE no yes no no no yes no no
Country RE no no yes yes no no yes yes
Year FE yes yes no yes yes yes no yes
N 1341.00 1325.00 2094.00 1341.00 1341.00 1325.00 2094.00 1341.00
Log-Likelihood -217.88 -210.08 -249.31 -217.88 -214.23 -206.14 -246.06 -214.23
Table A14. Controlling for country effects and year fixed effects. Robust standard errors clustered at the country
level are in parentheses: *p < 0.1, **p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01.
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(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Anti-regime uprising 0.388*** 0.361*** 0.371***
(0.116) (0.117) (0.121)
Other uprising 0.099 0.105 0.181
(0.126) (0.115) (0.113)
Nonviolent anti-regime uprising 0.792*** 0.835*** 0.813***
(0.191) (0.190) (0.191)
Violent anti-regime uprising 0.256* 0.215 0.223
(0.134) (0.132) (0.139)
Prior liberalization 2.922* 4.216** 3.949** 2.438 3.480** 3.451**
(1.695) (1.761) (1.759) (1.642) (1.743) (1.710)
Coercive capacity -1.258 -1.776** -1.618** -1.156 -1.623** -1.502**
(0.837) (0.760) (0.781) (0.809) (0.714) (0.741)
Elite unrest 0.303 0.460 0.464 0.333 0.486* 0.479
(0.297) (0.281) (0.292) (0.299) (0.284) (0.296)
Irregular leader change -0.020 0.009 0.066 -0.043 -0.022 0.039
(0.376) (0.360) (0.361) (0.364) (0.348) (0.351)
GDP per capita 0.480** 0.493** 0.454** 0.343 0.403* 0.333
(0.230) (0.216) (0.196) (0.247) (0.232) (0.215)
Economic growth -0.017 -0.015 -0.015 -0.016 -0.015 -0.015
(0.016) (0.016) (0.016) (0.017) (0.016) (0.017)
Neighboring democracies 1.227*** 1.337*** 1.363*** 1.095*** 1.136** 1.203***
(0.427) (0.448) (0.415) (0.425) (0.443) (0.413)
Neighboring EAs 0.551 0.779* 0.824** 0.519 0.727* 0.805*
(0.404) (0.406) (0.410) (0.434) (0.429) (0.438)
Post-Cold War -5.858* -6.668** -6.696** -6.637** -7.374** -7.690**
(3.006) (2.926) (2.919) (3.137) (2.953) (3.014)
ln(Aid per capita) -0.613* -0.368 -0.328 -0.567 -0.374 -0.323
(0.362) (0.346) (0.383) (0.352) (0.330) (0.377)
Post-Cold*Aid 1.449** 1.540** 1.541** 1.637** 1.718*** 1.777***
(0.635) (0.621) (0.622) (0.650) (0.616) (0.632)
ln(Regime age) -0.324*** -0.273** -0.236* -0.336*** -0.287** -0.259**
(0.120) (0.114) (0.123) (0.117) (0.113) (0.120)
Linear trend 0.024 0.036* 0.037 0.022 0.034 0.035
(0.024) (0.022) (0.023) (0.024) (0.022) (0.023)
Inequality 1.879 1.583
(1.364) (1.358)
ln(Oil income per capita) -0.009 -0.037
(0.072) (0.080)
Trade openness -0.090 -0.120
(0.201) (0.210)
Constant -2.349 -1.981 -2.082 -1.520 -1.420 -1.151
(2.520) (2.515) (2.518) (2.469) (2.476) (2.517)
N 1818 2094 1878 1818 2094 1878
Log-Likelihood -233.76 -249.30 -241.58 -231.23 -245.96 -238.94
Table A15. Including additional variables (logit estimates). Robust standard errors
clustered at the country level are in parentheses: *p < 0.1, **p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01.
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(1) (2) (3) (4)
Anti-regime uprising 0.341*** 0.607*
(0.127) (0.318)
Other uprising 0.094 0.165
(0.117) (0.407)
Nonviolent anti-regime uprising 0.796*** 1.164**
(0.171) (0.495)
Violent anti-regime uprising 0.195 0.574
(0.149) (0.375)
Military regime 1.031 1.152 0.944 1.170
(0.627) (0.847) (0.645) (0.901)
Party-based regime 1.013 0.978 0.935 1.207
(0.683) (0.874) (0.691) (0.908)
Personalist regime 1.282 1.868** 1.332* 2.035**
(0.790) (0.898) (0.791) (0.950)
Military regime×Anti-regime uprising -0.010
(0.354)
Party-based regime×Anti-regime uprising -0.000
(0.392)
Personalist regime×Anti-regime uprising -0.718**
(0.350)
Party-based regime×Other uprising 0.279
(0.478)
Personalist regime×Other uprising -0.033
(0.421)
Military regime×Nonviolent anti-regime uprising -0.417
(0.555)
Party-based regime×Nonviolent anti-regime uprising -0.137
(0.587)
Military regime×Violent anti-regime uprising -0.151
(0.426)
Party-based regime×Violent anti-regime uprising -0.260
(0.503)
Personalist regime×Violent anti-regime uprising -0.657*
(0.389)
Controls full full full full
N 2033 1954 2033 2023
Log-Likelihood -239.80 -231.59 -236.64 -232.49
Table A16. Examining how prior regime types influence the effect of mass uprisings (logit
estimates). Robust standard errors clustered at the country level are in parentheses: *p < 0.1,
**p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01.
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Figure A2. Modeling distribution of Anti-regime uprising estimate. This figure
depicts the distribution of the estimates on Anti-regime uprising. Vertical line
indicates the estimate of Anti-regime uprising as reported in Model 3 of Table 1
in the main text.
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8 Matching analysis
Tab A17 presents the balance statistics before and after the coarsened exact matching. Table
A19 reports logit estimates based on matched samples. As explained in the main text, I use
the method of coarsened exact matching (Iacus et al., 2011) and pre-processed the data to
minimize any potential differences between cases with Anti-regime uprising or Nonviolent anti-
regime uprising and cases without Anti-regime uprising or Nonviolent anti-regime uprising
before conducting the parametric analysis. I match on Prior liberalization, Coercive capacity,
Elite unrest, Urban population, GDP per capita, Economic growth, Neighboring democracies
and Post-Cold War period. Table A19 shows that the main finding is robust to the use of
matched samples.
Before matching After CEM
Variable L1 distance Diff-in-Means L1 distance Diff-in-Means
Prior liberalization 0.240 -0.143 0.119 -0.056
Coercive capacity 0.166 -0.039 0.128 0.009
Elite unrest 0.120 0.120 0.000 0.000
Urban population 0.173 -8.265 0.178 -0.136
GDP per capita 0.246 -0.568 0.104 -0.202
Economic growth 0.174 -1.528 0.107 0.026
Neighboring democracies 0.086 -0.049 0.136 -0.940
Post-Cold War 0.013 0.013 0.000 -0.000
Table A17. Balance statistics before and after matching on anti-regime uprisings
Before matching After CEM
Variable L1 distance Diff-in-Means L1 distance Diff-in-Means
Prior liberalization 0.204 -0.066 0.123 -0.050
Coercive capacity 0.154 -0.035 0.164 -0.005
Elite unrest 0.042 0.042 0.000 -0.000
Urban population 0.201 1.942 0.262 -0.080
GDP per capita 0.299 -0.041 0.122 -0.364
Economic growth 0.169 -1.287 0.105 0.019
Neighboring democracies 0.227 0.086 0.159 1.735
Post-Cold War 0.030 0.030 0.000 -0.000
Table A18. Balance statistics before and after matching on nonviolent anti-regime uprisings
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Treatment:
Anti-regime uprisings Nonviolent uprisings
(1) (2)
Anti-regime uprising 1.100***
(0.380)
Nonviolent anti-regime uprising 1.421***
(0.506)
Prior liberalization 9.118*** 2.605
(2.324) (3.272)
Coercive capacity -1.829** -1.362
(0.883) (1.141)
Elite unrest 0.861* 0.540
(0.450) (0.571)
Irregular leader change -0.549 -0.140
(0.480) (0.822)
GDP per capita 0.685*** -0.082
(0.245) (0.471)
Economic growth -0.039 -0.008
(0.027) (0.069)
Neighboring democracies 1.424** 0.953
(0.691) (0.718)
Neighboring EAs 0.320 -0.470
(0.729) (0.854)
Post-Cold War -4.211 -7.814
(4.531) (5.193)
ln(Aid per capita) -0.566 -1.869**
(0.500) (0.767)
Post-Cold*Aid 0.907 1.937*
(0.994) (1.075)
ln(Regime age) -0.261* -0.320
(0.151) (0.216)
Linear trend 0.050 0.050
(0.037) (0.034)
Constant -3.595 8.101
(2.952) (5.121)
N 1374 717
Log-Likelihood -152 -117
Table A19. Using matched samples (logit estimates). Model 2 and 4 use 10
multiply imputed data. Robust standard errors clustered at the country level
are in parentheses: *p < 0.1, **p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01.
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9 Assessing bias from unobservables
As explained in the main text, I adopt the strategy proposed by Altonji et al. (2005) to
evaluate the likelihood that selection bias due to unobservables may be driving the results.
This strategy assesses how many times stronger selection on unobservables would have to
be relative to selection on observables, included in my empirical model, to explain away the
estimated effect of Anti-regime uprising. The calculation is based on the ratio βˆF/(βˆR − βˆF )
where βˆF is the coefficient of Anti-regime uprising in Model 3 with full controls and βˆR is the
coefficient of Anti-regime uprising in models with a set of restricted controls. A large ratio
suggests that it is implausible that bias from unobservables explains away the entire effect
of Anti-regime uprising. Following Nunn and Wantchekon (2011), I use linear probability
models to obtain βˆF and βˆR.
Controls in the restricted set Controls in the full set Ratios
Coefficient of Anti-regime Uprising
None Full controls from Model 3 of Table 2 3.33
ln(Regime age), a linear time trend Full controls from Model 3 of Table 2 16.67
ln(Regime age), a linear time trend, and Full controls from Model 3 of Table 2 19.36
Other uprising
Coefficient of Nonviolent anti-regime Uprising
None Full controls from Model 3 of Table 3 8.46
ln(Regime age) Full controls from Model 3 of Table 3 10.62
ln(Regime age), a linear time trend, and Full controls from Model 3 of Table 3 11.44
Violent uprising
Table A20. Assessing the Bias from Unobservables by Using Selection on Observables.
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10 Multiple Imputation
For multiple imputation, I use the Amelia II package for R (Honaker et al., 2011). I use
countries and years to index the cross-section and time units. I include all the variables used in
Table 2 and supplementary analyses reported in the appendix. Following the recommendations
of Honaker et al. (2011), I also include lags and leads on the main variables of interest. In
order to avoid implausible imputations in the analysis, I use only data since 1961, the first
year that foreign aid data is available. Finally, I use a 5% ridge prior in order to improve the
numerical stability of the imputations. After multiple imputation, the sample includes 124
countries in 3,030 country-years.
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